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The intersection of climate change, human migration, and conflict presents 
a unique challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. These three 
factors are already beginning to combine in ways that undermine traditional 
understandings of national security and offer ample reason to revisit traditional 
divisions of labor between diplomacy, defense, and economic, social, and 
environmental development policy abroad. 
This report is the first in a series of papers from the Center for American 
Progress that will examine the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict 
and its implications. The series will highlight the overlays of these three factors 
in key regions around the world and examine the ways in which U.S. policy must 
adapt to meet the challenges they present. 
This introductory paper lays the foundation for a series of subsequent regional 
reports focused on northwest Africa, India and Bangladesh, the Andean region, 
and China. This series is closely linked to the Center for American Progress’s 
longstanding Sustainable Security project, which argues that our understanding 
of national security must be broadened to meet the threats of the coming 
decades. Indeed, national security, human security, environmental security, and 
collective security all have a part to play in achieving a safer and more equitable 
international environment.
We are especially grateful to the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Washington, D.C., 
as well as the ZEIT-Stiftung Gerd and Ebelin Bucerius in Hamburg for their 
continuing support of our climate, migration, and security work at the Center for 
American Progress.
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Introduction and summary
The costs and consequences of climate change on our world will define the 21st 
century. Even if nations across our planet were to take immediate steps to rein 
in carbon emissions—an unlikely prospect—a warmer climate is inevitable. As 
the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC, noted in 2007, 
human-created “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident 
from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, wide-
spread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.”1 
As these ill effects progress they will have serious implications for U.S. national 
security interests as well as global stability—extending from the sustainability of 
coastal military installations to the stability of nations that lack the resources, good 
governance, and resiliency needed to respond to the many adverse consequences 
of climate change. And as these effects accelerate, the stress will impact human 
migration and conflict around the world. 
It is difficult to fully understand the detailed causes of migration and economic 
and political instability, but the growing evidence of links between climate change, 
migration, and conflict raise plenty of reasons for concern. This is why it’s time to 
start thinking about new and comprehensive answers to multifaceted crisis sce-
narios brought on or worsened by global climate change. As Achim Steiner, execu-
tive director of the U.N. Environment Program, argues, “The question we must 
continuously ask ourselves in the face of scientific complexity and uncertainty, 
but also growing evidence of climate change, is at what point precaution, common 
sense or prudent risk management demands action.”2 
In the coming decades climate change will increasingly threaten humanity’s shared 
interests and collective security in many parts of the world, disproportionately 
affecting the globe’s least developed countries. Climate change will pose challeng-
ing social, political, and strategic questions for the many different multinational, 
regional, national, and nonprofit organizations dedicated to improving the human 
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condition worldwide. Organizations as different as Amnesty International, the 
U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the International 
Rescue Committee, and the World Health Organization will all have to tackle 
directly the myriad effects of climate change.
Climate change also poses distinct challenges to U.S. national security. Recent 
intelligence reports and war games, including some conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Defense, conclude that over the next two or three decades, 
vulnerable regions (particularly sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South and 
Southeast Asia) will face the prospect of food shortages, water crises, and cata-
strophic flooding driven by climate change. These developments could demand 
U.S., European, and international humanitarian relief or military responses, often 
the delivery vehicle for aid in crisis situations.
This report provides the foundation and overview for a series of papers focusing 
on the particular challenges posed by the cumulative effects of climate change, 
migration, and conflict in some of our world’s most complex environments. In the 
papers following this report, we plan to outline the effects of this nexus in north-
west Africa, in India and Bangladesh, in the Andean region of South America, and 
in China. In this paper we detail that nexus across our planet and offer wide-
ranging recommendations about how the United States, its allies in the global 
community, and the community at large can deal with the coming climate-driven 
crises with comprehensive sustainable security solutions encompassing national 
security, diplomacy, and economic, social, and environmental development. 
Here, we briefly summarize our arguments and our conclusions.
The nexus
The Arab Spring can be at least partly credited to climate change. Rising food 
prices and efforts by authoritarian regimes to crush political protests were linked 
first to food and then to political repression—two important motivators in the 
Arab makeover this past year. 
To be sure, longstanding economic and social distress and lack of opportunity for 
so many Arab youth in the Middle East and across North Africa only needed a 
spark to ignite revolutions across the region. But environmental degradation and 
the movement of people from rural areas to already overcrowded cities alongside 
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rising food prices enabled the cumulative effects of long-term economic and 
political failures to sweep across borders with remarkable agility. 
It does not require much foresight to acknowledge that other effects of climate 
change will add to the pressure in the decades to come. In particular the cumula-
tive overlays of climate change with human migration driven by environmental 
crises, political conflict caused by this migration, and competition for more scarce 
resources will add new dimensions of complexity to existing and future crisis 
scenarios. It is thus critical to understand how governments plan to answer and 
prioritize these new threats from climate change, migration, and conflict. 
Climate change 
Climate change alone poses a daunting challenge. No matter what steps the global 
community takes to mitigate carbon emissions, a warmer climate is inevitable. The 
effects are already being felt today and will intensify as climate change worsens. 
All of the world’s regions and nations will experience some of the effects of this 
transformational challenge. 
Here’s just one case in point: African states are likely to be the most vulnerable to 
multiple stresses, with up to 250 million people projected to suffer from water and 
food insecurity and, in low-lying areas, a rising sea level.3 As little as 1 percent of 
Africa’s land is located in low-lying coastal zones but this land supports 12 percent 
of its urban population.4  
Furthermore, a majority of people in Africa live in lower altitudes—including the 
Sahel, the area just south of the Sahara—where the worst effects of water scarcity, 
hotter temperatures, and longer dry seasons are expected to occur.5 These devel-
opments may well be exacerbated by the lack of state and regional capacity to 
manage the effects of climate change. These same dynamics haunt many nations in 
Asia and the Americas, too, and the implications for developed countries such as 
the United States and much of Europe will be profound.
Migration
Migration adds another layer of complexity to the scenario. In the 21st century 
the world could see substantial numbers of climate migrants—people displaced 
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by either the slow or sudden onset of the effects of climate change. The United 
Nations’ recent Human Development Report stated that, worldwide, there are 
already an estimated 700 million internal migrants—those leaving their homes 
within their own countries—a number that includes people whose migration is 
related to climate change and environmental factors. Overall migration across 
national borders is already at approximately 214 million people worldwide,6 
with estimates of up to 20 million displaced in 2008 alone because of a rising sea 
level, desertification, and flooding.7 
One expert, Oli Brown of the International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
predicts a tenfold increase in the current number of internally displaced persons 
and international refugees by 2050.8 It is important to acknowledge that there is no 
consensus on this estimate. In fact there is major disagreement among experts about 
how to identify climate as a causal factor in internal and international migration. 
But even though the root causes of human mobility are not always easy to deci-
pher, the policy challenges posed by that movement are real. A 2009 report by 
the International Organization for Migration produced in cooperation with the 
United Nations University and the Climate Change, Environment and Migration 
Alliance cites numbers that range from “200 million to 1 billion migrants from cli-
mate change alone, by 2050,”9 arguing that “environmental drivers of migration are 
often coupled with economic, social and developmental factors that can accelerate 
and to a certain extent mask the impact of climate change.” 
The report also notes that “migration can result from different environmental 
factors, among them gradual environmental degradation (including desertifica-
tion, soil and coastal erosion) and natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods or 
tropical storms).”10 (See box on page 15 for a more detailed definition of climate 
migrants.) Clearly, then, climate change is expected to aggravate many existing 
migratory pressures around the world. Indeed associated extreme weather events 
resulting in drought, floods, and disease are projected to increase the number of 
sudden humanitarian crises and disasters in areas least able to cope, such as those 
already mired in poverty or prone to conflict.11 
Conflict
This final layer is the most unpredictable, both within nations and transnationally, 
and will force the United States and the international community to confront 
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climate and migration challenges within an increasingly unstructured local or 
regional security environment. In contrast to the great power conflicts and the 
associated proxy wars that marked most of the 20th century, the immediate post-
Cold War decades witnessed a diffusion of national security interests and threats. 
U.S. national security policy is increasingly integrating thinking about nonstate 
actors and nontraditional sources of conflict and instability, for example in the 
fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.
Climate change is among these newly visible issues sparking conflict. But because 
the direct link between conflict and climate change is unclear, awareness of the 
indirect links has yet to lead to substantial and sustained action to address its 
security implications. Still the potential for the changing climate to induce conflict 
or exacerbate existing instability in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions is 
now recognized in national security circles in the United States, although research 
gaps still exists in many places. 
The climate-conflict nexus was highlighted with particular effect by the current 
U.S. administration’s security-planning reviews over the past two years, as well as 
the Center for Naval Analysis, which termed climate change a “threat multiplier,” 
indicating that it can exacerbate existing stresses and insecurity.12 The Pentagon’s 
latest Quadrennial Defense Review also recognized climate change as an “acceler-
ant of instability or conflict,” highlighting the operational challenges that will con-
front U.S. and partner militaries amid a rising sea level, growing extreme weather 
events, and other anticipated effects of climate change.13 The U.S. Department of 
Defense has even voiced concern for American military installations that may be 
threatened by a rising sea level.14
There is also well-developed international analysis on these points. The United 
Kingdom’s 2010 Defense Review, for example, referenced the security aspects 
of climate change as an evolving challenge for militaries and policymakers. 
Additionally, in 2010, the Nigerian government referred to climate change as 
the “greatest environmental and humanitarian challenge facing the country this 
century,” demonstrating that climate change is no longer seen as solely scientific 
or environmental, but increasingly as a social and political issue cutting across all 
aspects of human development.15 
As these three threads—climate change, migration, and conflict—interact more 
intensely, the consequences will be far-reaching and occasionally counterintuitive. 
It is impossible to predict the outcome of the Arab Spring movement, for example, 
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but the blossoming of democracy in some countries and the demand for it in oth-
ers is partly an unexpected result of the consequences of climate change on global 
food prices. On the other hand, the interplay of these factors will drive complex 
crisis situations in which domestic policy, international policy, humanitarian assis-
tance, and security converge in new ways. 
Areas of concern
Several regional hotspots frequently come up in the international debate on climate 
change, migration, and conflict. Climate migrants in northwest Africa, for example, 
are causing communities across the region to respond in different ways, often to 
the detriment of regional and international security concerns. Political and social 
instability in the region plays into the hands of organizations such as Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb. And recent developments in Libya, especially the large number 
of weapons looted from depots after strongman Moammar Qaddafi’s regime fell—
which still remain unaccounted for—are a threat to stability across North Africa. 
Effective solutions need not address all of these issues simultaneously but must 
recognize the layers of relationships among them. And these solutions must also 
recognize that these variables will not always intersect in predictable ways. While 
some migrants may flee floodplains, for example, others may migrate to them in 
search of greater opportunities in coastal urban areas.16
Bangladesh, already well known for its disastrous floods, faces rising waters in 
the future due to climate-driven glacial meltdowns in neighboring India. The 
effects can hardly be over. In December 2008 the National Defense University 
in Washington, D.C., ran an exercise that explored the impact of a flood that sent 
hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring India. The result: the exercise 
predicted a new wave of migration would touch off religious conflicts, encourage 
the spread of contagious diseases, and cause vast damage to infrastructure.
India itself is not in a position to absorb climate-induced pressures—never mind 
foreign climate migrants. The country will contribute 22 percent of global popula-
tion growth and have close to 1.6 billion inhabitants by 2050, causing demographic 
developments that are sure to spark waves of internal migration across the country.
Then there’s the Andean region of South America, where melting glaciers and 
snowcaps will drive climate, migration, and security concerns. The average rate of 
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glacial melting has doubled over the past few years, according to the World Glacier 
Monitoring Service.17 Besides Peru, which faces the gravest consequences in Latin 
America, a number of other Andean countries will be massively affected, includ-
ing Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. This development will put water security, 
agricultural production, and power generation at risk—all factors that could 
prompt people to leave their homes and migrate. The IPCC report argues that the 
region is especially vulnerable because of its fragile ecosystem.18 
Finally, China is now in its fourth decade of ever-growing internal migration, 
some of it driven in recent years by environmental change. Today, across its vast 
territory, China continues to experience the full spectrum of climate change-
related consequences that have the potential to continue to encourage such 
migration. The Center for a New American Security recently found that the con-
sequences of climate change and continued internal migration in China include 
“water stress; increased droughts, flooding, or other severe events; increased 
coastal erosion and saltwater inundation; glacial melt in the Himalayas that 
could affect hundreds of millions; and shifting agricultural zones”—all of which 
will affect food supplies.19 
These four regions of the world—northwest Africa, India and Bangladesh, the 
Andean region, and China—will require global, regional, and local policies to 
deal with the consequences of climate change, migration, and conflict. Alas, 
such policies that might be effective in these complex crisis environments can-
not be designed within the existing global institutional framework. There are 
many reasons for this. 
In the United States, as in many other developed nations, the defense, diplo-
macy, and economic and social development silos are not adept at analyzing the 
input of a broad range of policy fields in combination with direct dialogue with 
the people of the affected regions. From Europe’s perspective, the fragmented 
nature of the continent’s reaction to rising climate migrants from Africa stands 
out. From the perspective of regional powers such as India, China, Brazil, and 
South Africa, there are yet again different sets of policy priorities that block 
action. And from the perspective of multilateral organizations, there is another 
set of policy disconnects. 
Yet action is critical. Environmentally induced migration, resource conflicts, and 
unstable states will not only have an impact upon the nations where they occur, 
but also on the United States and the broader international community. 
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Moving forward
The interplay of migration, climate change, and conflict is complex and will be 
with us for the long term. Nevertheless, the uncertainty surrounding the exact 
causality should not be a reason for ignoring this key nexus. And while the causal 
relationship may not always be clear, the lines of inquiry moving forward are 
becoming apparent. To understand this nexus, we will need to ask, for example, 
what role mediating factors such as economic opportunity, levels of development, 
health indicators, and legal status will play in the relationship between climate 
change and migration. It will be equally critical to determine whether there is a 
threshold at which the effects of climate change could be significant enough to 
cause migration directly, or at what level of climate change it will become the most 
important of several migration “push” factors. 
Additionally, we should ask whether climate change will alter the composition of 
migrant communities. Migrants, after all, are not necessarily the most desperate or 
destitute of their countrymen and women. Migrations, particularly across inter-
national borders, often require means.20 Could a significant increase in extreme 
weather events or long-term shifts in climate norms alter this dynamic, and what 
would be the implications of that shift?
Some instances of the complete climate, migration, and conflict nexus exist to 
guide the examination of these questions. Consider, for example, the Second 
Tuareg Rebellion in Mali in 1990. British economist Nicholas Stern argues that 
drought in Mali in the decades preceding the conflict contributed to local and 
international migration. Those who later tried to return found a “lack of social 
support networks for returning migrants, continuing drought, and competition 
for resources between nomadic and settled people,” all of which were among the 
factors that sparked the rebellion.21 
Jeffrey Mazo at the International Institute of Strategic Studies adds that the 
forced migration ultimately pushed some young men into Algeria and Libya, 
“where many were radicalized”—a dangerous development in an already unstable 
region.22 In past months refugees from Qaddafi’s former regime in Libya have 
been taking refuge with the Tuareg along the borders of Libya, Algeria, and Mali.
Imagine similar migration-fueled conflicts in India and Bangladesh, the Andean 
region, and in China. We can’t know how they might develop but we do know the 
three ingredients—climate change, migration, and conflict. From the perspective 
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of a forward-looking policymaker, situations like this suggest that the uncertainty 
that still surrounds the climate, migration, and conflict nexus requires greater 
attention when it comes to security solutions, not less.23
In this paper and the reports to follow, we will discuss regional case studies in 
which the cumulative effects of climate change, migration, and conflict interact 
within a broad framework of political, economic, and environmental security chal-
lenges. Our objective is to develop a robust contemporary notion of sustainable 
security that effectively integrates defense, diplomacy, and development into a 
comprehensive policy designed to deal with today’s global threats while prevent-
ing future threats from occurring. 
We delve into these recommendations in detail at the end of this paper but in 
this section we briefly explain how we believe the international community, the 
United States, its allies, and key regional players can together create a sustain-
able security situation to deal with climate change, migration, and conflict. 
Specifically they must: 
•	 Conduct federal government institutional reform in the United States that 
addresses the development-security relationship and that prioritizes planning 
for long-term humanitarian consequences of climate change and migration as a 
core national security issue
•	 Develop strategies to strengthen intergovernmental cooperation on trans-
boundary risks in different regions of the world
•	 Increase funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative
•	 Ensure better information flows and more effective disaster response for early-
warning systems 
•	 Support the best science to expand our understanding of specific circumstances 
such as desertification, rainfall variability, disaster occurrence, and coastal ero-
sion, and their relation to human migration and conflict
•	 Identify regions most vulnerable to climate-induced migration, both forced 
and voluntary, in order to target aid, information, and contingency-planning 
capabilities
10 Center for american progress | Climate Change, migration, and Conflict
•	 View migration as a proactive adaptation strategy for local populations under 
pressure due to increased environmental change
A truly sustainable approach to security, then, requires us not only to look at the 
traditional security threats posed by the interaction between states, but also to 
understand that the security of the United States is advanced by promoting the 
individual well-being of people across the developing world, and by embracing 
collective responses to shared threats posed by climate change. We turn first to 
understanding the dynamics of those threats.
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The climate change,  
migration, and conflict nexus
 
 
The relationship between human migration and climate change is beginning to 
become an issue worthy of increasing attention in the international realm. The 
United Nations consistently tries to draw more attention to the issue, and in 2008 
the European Union’s foreign policy chief issued a dire warning that large numbers 
of climate migrants from Africa were headed for Europe.24 If “worst case” climate 
change scenarios of more than a 10 degree Fahrenheit average increase in global 
temperatures were to come true, then our planet would become uninhabitable 
in many parts that are relatively stable right now. But even if temperatures rise 
within the range that is expected by the global scientific community—somewhere 
between 4 and 8 degrees Fahrenheit—environmental degradation and extreme 
weather events will undoubtedly create new migratory pressures in parts of the 
globe most at risk to climate change.
To date it is difficult to accurately isolate examples where climate change is driv-
ing conflict or is the core reason for migration. Yet there are increasing numbers 
of examples where the impact of local or regional climate change is placing 
major stress on weak or conflict-prone states with potentially disastrous results. 
In a major January 2011 report to the European commission, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, for example, reaffirmed that, in “areas 
with weak or brittle states, climate change will increase the risks of resource short-
ages, mass migrations and civil conflict.”25 
The simple fact is that the need for action far outweighs scientific uncertainties, 
an idea reflected by the U.N. Security Council’s debate earlier this year on climate 
change and security. (See sidebar on page 12 for the mix of demographic pressures 
posed by population growth in many of these regions of the world.)
Climate and migration 
Existing research and observation establish clear justification for concern about 
the broader implications of extreme changes in weather patterns. In fact, migration 
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due in part to climate variation is a regular feature of life for some populations. 
In the Sahel labor migrants have long been known to follow the variations of the 
seasons. David Rain of The George Washington University notes that in the 1920s 
members of Niger’s Hausa population were known to relocate on a temporary basis 
to northern Nigeria during the dry season. This climate-driven circulation allowed 
them to take advantage of Nigeria’s booming markets for cattle and crops.32  
Indeed, past experience gives ample reason to believe that climate and migra-
tion are linked. Human mobility, visibly induced by sudden and extreme weather 
events, serves as a temporary coping strategy or an impetus for permanent reloca-
tion. Etienne Piguet, who heads the population geography work at University of 
Neuchatel’s Geography Department in Switzerland, argues that the swift onset of 
Keeping pace with changing global trends is an enormous challenge. 
Today close to 7 billion people live on earth—a number that will 
rise to an estimated 9 billion by 2050. Every year the world’s popula-
tion grows by 80 million people, equaling the total population of 
Germany or Egypt, a total of 220,000 people a day.26 
Consequently, our way of life, our security, and our prosperity are no 
longer decided by us alone. Rather the growing and shifting global 
population will have geopolitical implications. In 1950 the popula-
tion of today’s Russian Federation “was more than double the size 
of Pakistan’s population; now they are roughly the same size. By 
mid-century, however, Pakistan’s population is expected to be more 
than triple the size of the Russian Federation’s.”27 This demographic 
reality posed against the realities of recent massive floods, internal 
and cross-border migration, and ethnic and religious conflict in and 
around Pakistan exemplifies the risk that population pressures will 
pose to Pakistan and its neighbors.
As the global distribution of population changes, scarcity will affect 
critical global resources such as the large river basins across Asia 
that empty into the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal, and East China and 
South China seas. Some of these rivers, including the Yangtze, Yellow, 
and Huai,28 are “projected to decrease due to climate change which, 
along with population growth and increasing demand arising from 
higher standards of living, could adversely affect more than a billion 
people by the 2050s,”29 according to the IPCC 2007 Synthesis Report.
The African continent, because of its rapid increase in population 
and significant economic growth in recent years, will also be at the 
forefront of these developments. Within a decade yields from rain-
fed agriculture could be reduced by half across the continent, and 
agricultural production—including access to food—in many African 
countries is projected to be severely compromised.30 Over the next 
decades, experts project an increase of 5 percent to 8 percent of arid 
and semi-arid land in Africa under a range of climate scenarios.31 
As these global trends progress, they will contribute to the growth of 
crisis scenarios driven in some cases by the intersections of climate 
change, human migration, and conflict. Existing migration routes in 
northwest Africa, for example, link an arc of tension from Nigeria and 
Niger to Algeria and Morocco. While many migrants in the region will 
travel only within their own countries, those who have the means to 
cross international borders will travel through politically, economi-
cally, and environmentally fragile areas. Rising temperatures and sea 
level, among other projected effects of climate change in the region, 
will influence their decisions to migrate or remain. 
Looking ahead: The world between now and 2050
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natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods normally provokes only a tempo-
rary relocation. He notes in one of his studies that “a synthesis of results of migra-
tion choices of victims of natural disasters displaced in 18 sites confirms—with 
rare exceptions—the strong propensity to return.”33 
Piguet, drawing on the work of Dominic 
Kniveton at the Sussex Centre for Migration 
Research and others for the International 
Organization for Migration, suggests that 
migrants may not return, however, in cases 
where the population depends on the local 
environment for livelihoods and “human 
action exacerbates the environmental aspect 
of the disaster.”34 Kniveton cites the Dust Bowl 
and consequent mass migration that occurred 
in the United States in the 1930s as a prime 
example of this effect.35 
Despite a wealth of evidence that human 
mobility has been affected by weather and cli-
mate patterns, however, the connections have 
rarely been straightforward. A confluence of 
factors drive migration decisions, and it is difficult to discern relative influence. 
Michigan State University geography Professor Antoinette WinklerPrins, for 
example, finds that regular patterns of migration in Brazil between lowland areas 
and upland bluffs during flood season were interrupted by a period of relative 
stasis in the mid-20th century, when residents learned to grow moisture-loving 
jute as a cash crop during flood season. As the jute market deflated, however, 
the traditional pattern of migration was reestablished.36 Thus, although the flood 
season was a factor in the mobility of the population, it appears to have been 
mediated through an economic incentive. But these mostly economic responses 
to changing weather patterns are only examples of what profound climate 
change could prompt in regions across the planet. 
Climate change and migration
Some studies postulate that climate change already contributes to displacement 
and migration, although most of this movement remains internal.37 Throughout 
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previous droughts during the second half of the 20th century in Africa’s Sahel 
region, for example, migration ranged from local and cross-border movements 
to international migration depending on the context, with cross-border migra-
tion in these states facilitated by relatively porous borders.38 In the case of natu-
ral disasters in particular, migrants tend to keep movements localized, as seen 
in the case of the tsunami-affected regions of Sri Lanka as well as the southern 
region of the United States affected by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. Evacuees 
of both areas did not cross nearby borders, but instead moved to their families 
in other parts of the country.39 Even a disaster as overwhelming as the Asian 
Tsunami in 2004 showed a majority of affected people who remained displaced 
within their own countries.40
The projections for future displacement driven by climate change are daunting. 
A 2009 report41 by a coalition of organizations, including CARE International 
and the United Nations University, examined seven vulnerable regions where the 
consequences of climate change could ultimately contribute to significant human 
displacement. Included among these areas is the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, where 
nearly half of the residents and half of the delta’s agricultural lands would be 
flooded by a six-foot rise in sea level.42 
Scenarios like this suggest that it is shortsighted not to think comprehensively 
about key risk multipliers represented by overlays of migration, climate, and con-
flict. Failure to do so risks undermining long-term stability and security interests. 
Climate change, migration, and conflict
Jeffrey Mazo of the International Institute for Strategic Studies argues that the 
ongoing civil war in Darfur represents the “first modern climate-change conflict,” 
a position supported at least in part by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and 
former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, among others.43 Secretary General Moon 
argued in 2007 that the Darfur violence took root in a drought that began in the 
1980s. The drying climate disrupted traditional patterns of co-existence between 
farmers and herders and led to scarcity, which contributed to fighting, and “by 
2003, it evolved into the full-fledged tragedy we witness today.”44 
Climate was not the only or primary factor in the conflict, but it did serve as a 
source of stress on an incapable regime that a more effective government could 
have managed without it resulting in more than 200,000 dead and millions 
The projections 
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No universally accepted concepts, much less legal categories, 
exist to describe or define climate migrants. There is agreement, 
however, that factors such as drought, flooding, severe weather, 
and environmental degradation can cause human mobility in large 
numbers that are certain to increase in the near future. 
Among the labels ascribed to these people are climate migrants, 
climate refugees, environmental refugees, environmental migrants, 
environmentally displaced persons, environmentally induced 
migrants, forced-climate migrants, and anticipatory refugees. 
The category of “climate refugees,” was first used by the U.N. 
Environmental Program in 1985 and is often the term of choice in 
literature and policy debates. Researcher Essam El-Hinnawi at the 
U.N. Environment Program first defined environmental refugees (a 
broader class than climate refugees) as:
 Those people who have been forced to leave their traditional 
habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked 
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) 
that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the 
quality of their life. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this defini-
tion is meant any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes 
in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily 
or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.45
In this paper we chose not to use the terms climate refugees  
and environmental refugees because of the many legal and 
political implications that are generally reserved for political 
refugees defined under the 1951 Refugee Convention. We  
share the concerns expressed by many working in this field  
that considering those who have been forced to move due to 
climate change as refugees would add so many people to that 
category that the resources intended for political refugees  
would be quickly depleted. 
In addition, climate migrants often have a higher degree of nego-
tiation room than refugees, particularly in the case of slow-onset 
climate change, where these migrants may have time to plan their 
relocation. Thus, we believe that the term “climate migrant” better 
recognizes the complexity of migration decisions in this situation.46 
While no internationally accepted definition for persons mov-
ing for environmental reasons exists to date, the International 
Organization of Migration, or IOM, an intergovernmental organiza-
tion with more than 130 member nations, put forward a working 
definition of “environmental migrants” in its 94th Council Session, a 
definition that also appears in the World Migration Report 2008 and 
various other publications. This definition encompasses, but is not 
limited to climate migrants. It recognizes that:
•	 Environmental migrants are not only those displaced by 
extreme environmental events but also those whose migra-
tion is triggered by deteriorating environmental conditions
•	 Environmentally induced movement can take place within as 
well as across international borders
•	 It can be both short term and long term
•	 Population movements triggered by environmental factors 
can be forced as well as a matter of choice
•	 All persons moving for environmental reasons are protected 
by international human-rights law
In addition, persons displaced within their country due to natural 
or human-made disasters are covered by provisions laid out in 
the IOM’s “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.” In this 
document the IOM underscores that governments have primary 
responsibility to protect and assist their internally displaced popu-
lations. Should a government not live up to this responsibility, the 
international community has a right to become engaged.
The temporal aspect of climate migration further complicates the 
categorization of climate migrants, resulting in at least three major 
types of climate migrants:
•	 Those temporarily dislocated due to disasters, whether natural 
or manmade
Continued on next page
Defining climate migrants
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Continued from previous page 
•	 Those permanently displaced due to drastic environmental 
changes, such as the construction of dams
•	 Those who migrate based on the gradual deterioration of envi-
ronmental conditions
We argue in this paper that, for the purposes of strategic and policy 
planning, using the term “climate migrants” does not require a delin-
eated set of descriptive conditions. Given that all the available param-
eters—rising temperatures, increasing mobility, global demographic 
growth, sustained instability, and massive gaps in governance—are 
creating conditions in which climate change, migration, and conflict 
will increasingly intersect, there is reason enough to worry and to 
engage in a policy conversation. 
Currently no international standards or definition for data collec-
tion exist regarding persons displaced by climate events. Kate Halff, 
the head of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, recently 
pointed out the need to establish systematic monitoring, including 
the creation of a global database for estimating displacement from 
natural disasters and the inclusion of climate migration induced by 
slow-onset disasters.47
displaced. Shifting to a more comprehensive understanding of climate change, 
migration, and conflict, however, will be a significant challenge. 
Yet the complexity of the variables affecting migration has led some organiza-
tions to omit migration from their socioeconomic and environmental mapping 
equations on climate-security entirely, causing them to focus instead on concrete 
responses to climate change, food insecurity, and livelihoods.48 This is particularly 
true in the case of migration driven by slow-onset events, (as compared to sudden, 
massive displacements due to disaster), which may be indistinguishable from 
other forms of adaptation. 
Professor James Lee of American University—an expert on the environment, con-
flict, and trade—envisions structural and behavioral pathways from climate change 
to conflict, none of which provide a direct causal link between the phenomena. 
Specifically, Lee argues that three structural conditions—sustained climate variabil-
ity, intervening variables that weaken adaptive capacity, and conflict triggers such as 
political assassination—are needed in order for climate change to exercise influence 
over the occurrence of conflict. Intrinsic and behavioral factors such as scarcity, 
abundance, and perceptions of national sovereignty can also influence this process.49 
Lee is correct that clear causal arrows between these factors are difficult to draw, 
but some of the links in the climate, migration, and conflict nexus have long been 
apparent. The most obvious connection is forced migration sparked by security 
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challenges in the “sending” areas from which migrants depart, where the effects of 
climate change are clear. Climate migrants from these areas can be international or 
internal. It is time to see conflict-driven migration in a more complex context and 
recognize climate and environmental factors. 
A 2010 study by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council estimated that as of December 2010 there were an estimated 27.5 
million people worldwide experiencing internal displacement due to violence or 
conflict. Of this figure 11.1 million were based in Africa, where the majority of dis-
placement was driven by “conflict between the government and armed opposition 
groups, or by inter-ethnic violence,” although additional factors such as post-election 
unrest, banditry, and forced evictions were also contributory drivers.50 
There is also evidence to suggest that migration can contribute to conflict. Political 
scientists Idean Salehyan of the University of North Texas and Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch of the University of Essex examined the occurrence of conflict spillover 
facilitated by refugee flows in an effort to understand why the likelihood of conflict 
is higher for states bordering countries at war than for states whose neighbors are at 
peace. While noting that most refugee-recipient countries do not experience vio-
lence, Salehyan and Gleditsch argue that refugees fleeing civil wars into neighboring 
countries “often maintain ties to their homelands and continue to play an active role 
in conflicts at home, thereby physically extending rebel networks across space.” 
Moreover, the two experts found that these migrants may stress the receiving 
countries economically, demographically, or through the spread of infectious 
diseases—factors that can also increase the risk of conflict. Based on statistical 
analysis of refugee flows and conflict since 1951, Salehyan and Gleditsch found 
that “refugees from neighboring countries have a significant and positive effect on 
the probability of conflict.”51
The migration-conflict nexus is not only relevant for populations fleeing violence 
in their home countries. International relations expert Fiona Adamson of the 
University of London examines the broader phenomenon of international migra-
tion and argues that it can influence state national security in three ways: 
•	 Challenging state autonomy and sovereignty
•	 Reshaping the balance of power through the economic, military, and diplomatic 
implications of shifting populations
•	 Exacerbating the risk of conflict formation
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And yet the impact of these changes on state security is not necessarily negative. 
Adamson argues that receiving countries can gain strategic advantage through 
the selection of skilled migrants, or by utilizing migrant communities to enhance 
diplomacy and engagement with their home countries. Thus, the way in which 
countries choose to approach migration, and their capacity to shape migration 
flows in accordance with national interests, is critical.52 
But in some instances, the nexus is debilitating. 
In Nigeria and Niger, for example, increases 
in flooding, desertification, intensified migra-
tion, and ethnic conflict are evident across a 
common border among communities in both 
countries reliant on the same water sources. The 
consequences of climate change on cross-border 
human migration and ethnic conflict are clearly 
discernible, but so too is the reality of more inter-
nal and intercontinental migration as a result. 
Even though Nigeria has experienced economic 
growth of between 5 percent and 7 percent 
annually for the past decade, this has not 
translated into broadly improved conditions 
for the general population. “We are not seeing economic development so any 
manifestations of climate variability will force people to migrate,” argues Nsikan-
George Emana, the Director of Programs, Gender and Development Action in 
Nigeria. “Though the link between climate change and migration is often seen as 
coincidental, it’s a serious human situation and a threat to the socio-economic and 
political stability of any country or society.”53 
Although current news reports of environmental migration and political momen-
tum linking climate change and conflict remain ahead of conclusive research, the 
potential for proactive policy formulation as it pertains to the nexus still exists. In 
particular, as the global discourse surrounding the nuances of the nexus evolves, 
the possible repercussions of inaction due to uncertainty may serve as an impetus 
for adopting a “precautionary principle” approach. 
This would entail moving forward immediately on “low-hanging fruit” to reduce 
the vulnerabilities and risks associated with climate change, migration, and con-
flict, while raising awareness of this nexus among policymakers. Such a strategy 
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might help to create a more universal view that unites the ideas of fighting climate 
change swiftly and effectively, as well as adapting global policies to cope with 
climate migrants. The next section of our paper identifies where and why. 
The fierce urgency of now 
The climate, migration, and conflict nexus cannot be understood without thorough 
consideration of all of its individual elements, but it is climate change that adds par-
ticular urgency to this undertaking. Climate change is a daunting problem for citizens 
and policymakers. Its precise consequences are difficult to predict on the local level, 
and its impact will not be uniform among, or, in some cases, even within countries. 
Yet the general trajectory of global climate change is clear, as is the imperative to pre-
pare for its progression. As the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or 
IPCC, noted in 2007, human-induced “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, 
as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean tem-
peratures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.”54 
Global predictions of the development of climate change over the next century 
reveal a range of possible effects. The IPCC reviews climate change predictions 
under a variety of scenarios “covering a wide range of demographic, economic, 
and technological driving forces and resulting [greenhouse gas] emissions.”55 
According to the group’s 2007 assessment, continued growth in emissions over 
the scenarios considered by the panel may result in global average surface warming 
between 1.1 degrees and 6.4 degrees centigrade (up to 10.8 degrees Fahrenheit) 
and sea level rise of between 0.18 meters and 0.59 meters (between 6 and 22 
inches) by the end of the 21st century.56 The panel also foresees a future climate in 
which more intense hurricanes and typhoons are likely.57 
Even seemingly small variations in the climate can have outsized effects on human 
health and livelihood. Changes in climate and weather patterns, for example, 
will impact the production of a range of global commodities, including rice. The 
International Rice Research Institute compared data from rice yields and tempera-
ture measurements in the Philippines over an 11-year period and found that a 1 
degree Celsius rise in minimum nighttime temperatures corresponded to a 10 per-
cent drop in rice yields.58 According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, 
“rice cultivation is the principal activity and source of income for more than 100 
million households in developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”59 
The climate, 
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And rice will not be the only commodity affected by changes in climate and 
weather patterns. A study published earlier this year in the journal Science found 
that climate change is already having an effect on global maize yields. Farmers 
have produced about 3.8 percent less maize over the past three decades than they 
would have without the influence of climate change.60 A quantitative examination 
of maize yields and human migration from Mexico to the United States earlier 
this year by a team of Princeton University researchers suggests that “a 10 percent 
reduction in crop yields would lead an additional 2 percent of the population to 
emigrate.” Combining this data with climate change predictions, the Princeton 
researchers concluded that between 1.4 million and 6.7 million Mexicans could 
opt to migrate as a result of the effect of climate change on declining agriculture 
production by 2080. These predictions assume, however, that other factors, such 
as Mexico’s economic health relative to that of the United States and agricultural 
adaptation practices, are held constant.61
Climate change may also pose risks to human health through an increase in 
warmer days and nights. Extreme hot or cold temperatures can endanger lives, and 
gradual shifts in climate and their resultant effects on precipitation, pollen produc-
tion, and disease prevalence can significantly impact human health. According to 
the World Health Organization, “climatic conditions affect diseases transmitted 
through water, and via vectors such as mosquitoes. Climate-sensitive diseases are 
among the largest global killers.”62 
Some diseases, such as malaria, are already beginning to adapt to the changing 
climate. In Kenya malaria has spread beyond its traditional range into regions 
that health officials say were previously too cool to support it.63 Recent research 
indicates that “moderate increases” in existing methods of combating malaria 
would be adequate to offset the projected climate-driven impact of the disease, 
but this suggestion does not address government or donor capacity to provide 
expanded services.64 
Even if global climate change is brought under control sooner rather than later, 
carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere will continue to affect the earth’s 
climate.65 (see box) This process will increasingly influence the ability of some 
humans to subsist in their current locations. The people pushed from their homes 
by the effects of climate change will be faced with the questions of where and how 
to relocate families and livelihoods, either temporarily or permanently, and their 
decisions will have unique implications for the resources, people, communities, 
and countries they encounter as they migrate. 
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The most vulnerable to climate change
Climate change is likely to pose a disproportionate challenge to the least devel-
oped countries and small island nations. These states likely lack the resiliency, 
experience, and resources needed to respond or adapt to the changing climate 
and the consequent alterations in weather patterns, agriculture, disease, and 
human mobility. The citizens of these states played little role in speeding the world 
along its carbon-consumption path, but their lives and livelihoods may well be 
the most vulnerable to its scourges. As mentioned above, future reports in this 
series will highlight some of these hotspots, including northwest Africa, India and 
Bangladesh, and the Andean region of South America.
According to the IPCC’s 2007 report, the ability of countries to adapt to and 
mitigate the effects of climate change “is dependent on socio-economic and 
environmental circumstances and the availability of information and technol-
ogy.”67 Many of the developing countries that will be affected by climate change 
lack the infrastructure to respond to the range and scale of the possible effects. 
In Asia, for example, water shortages may impact 1 billion people by the 2050s, 
and the continent may see more frequent “intense precipitation events,” as well as 
more frequent and more extreme droughts, among other effects. Yet according to 
a study by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, 
Although there is uncertainty surrounding the precise effects of 
climate change over different parts of the globe over time, our lack 
of predictive power should not be taken as an excuse to delay acting 
with the information now available. Indeed, from a risk-management 
perspective, immediate action is the only sensible strategy. As the 
recent publication “Degrees of Risk” by E3G, a nonprofit organization 
focused on sustainable development, explains: 
The prospects for resolving uncertainty vary across different 
parts of the climate system, but few of the most important 
questions are likely to be resolved within the next decade. 
Waiting another 10 years to implement mitigation policies 
would lock in additional climate security risk through addi-
tional greenhouse gas emissions and would eliminate the 
option of stabilizing the climate at more ambitious levels 
should it prove necessary or desirable. While learning will play 
a key role in iterative decision-making over time, the prospect 
of learning should not imply that waiting to enact policies 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or to begin adapting to 
unavoidable changes is economically efficient. Formal analyses 
designed to test the optimal timing of climate policy under 
uncertainty never find that when future learning is taken into 
consideration inaction now is still the best response.66
This is indeed the most sensible way to proceed, as the main pages of 
this report will demonstrate. 
Degrees of risk due to climate change
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some parts of Asia have a suboptimal adaptive capacity because of “poor resource 
bases, inequalities in income, weak institutions, and limited technology.”68
Various initiatives exist to assist developing countries in their adaptation and 
mitigation efforts, such as the Climate Adaptation Fund established by the 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and the UNFCCC to counter global warming, 
adopted by over 190 countries. Then there is assistance from international 
organizations such as the World Bank, which supports investments in clean 
energy in the developing world and developed a “Strategic Framework for 
Development and Climate Change” in 200869, or regional help, such as India’s 
recent offer to establish a climate-adaptation fund for South Asia.70 These mea-
sures, however, will not be nearly enough to fill the need created by the conse-
quences of climate change. 
Developing nations and small island states will not only need adequate fund-
ing (no funds are allocated for migration so far), but also the expertise to carry 
out adaptation and mitigation efforts. These tasks could range from education 
or establishing early-warning systems, to implementing insurance for property 
and business owners, to altering crop mixtures and substantially modifying 
traditional land-use patterns. Assistance may also be required to help countries 
aggregate accurate nationwide data to identify mitigation needs and target relief 
to the most vulnerable communities. 
For the most at-risk nations, money, international assistance, and expertise are 
only the beginning of the adaptation process. The Maldives, a small island nation 
in the Indian Ocean, will be completely submerged if there is a rise in the sea level 
by one meter.71 The Maldives thus requires not only near-term assistance but also 
a long-term understanding with the international community on the measures to 
be taken if its territory disappears—the ultimate definition of climate migration. 
There is evidence that the international community is beginning to recognize 
the scale and diversity of the potential intersections between climate change and 
migration. Following climate talks in Cancun this past winter, the UNFCCC’s 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action issued a decision that recog-
nized this intersection explicitly. The agreement invited all parties to begin work 
on a number of adaption priorities, among them: “measures to enhance under-
standing, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced 
displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the 
national, regional and international levels.”72 
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Whether states will capitalize on this recommendation to inform their adaptation 
and mitigation priorities remains to be seen. In the next section of our report, we 
detail what the United States, Europe, regional powers, and international organiza-
tions are set up to do now and why this is inadequate for the challenge at hand. 
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Capacity development  
in the 21st century
 
 
The United States is today one of the few global powers capable and willing to act 
in the common interest. In absolute terms the United States has never been more 
influential. Its defense spending is unequalled by the next 20 countries combined. 
It spends the largest sum of official foreign-development assistance, exceeding the 
total spending of the next two nations, France and Germany.73 And it sustains the 
world’s most robust and ubiquitous diplomatic presence, boasting almost 12,000 
Foreign Service officers and over 260 diplomatic missions.
The United States remains the world’s dominant economy, too, with the world’s 
largest gross domestic product (the broadest measure of economic growth), of 
more than $14 trillion—roughly three times that of China, the second largest. The 
United States also attracts the largest flow of foreign direct investment, at more 
than $2.5 billion a year compared to half that in France or the United Kingdom. 
Finally, the United States possesses the most sought-after universities, drawing the 
best and brightest from around the globe.74 
Yet the emergence of new and significant regional powers around the world is 
altering the relative influence of the United States. This so-called “rise of the 
rest” has prompted the United States to review its current capabilities and the 
way it interacts with both the developed and developing world. What’s more, 
the global challenges are so many and so complex that a new division of labor is 
necessary, especially when it comes to long-term economic and social develop-
ment that is effective and sustainable. 
The Obama administration is seeking to transform U.S. global engagement to 
meet these new challenges in the 21st century. In early 2010 the administra-
tion released the congressionally mandated National Security Strategy75 and the 
Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review.76 Together, these texts begin 
to outline the emerging strategic environment that the United States faces—the 
growing role of emerging countries and the further diffusion of global political, 
economic, and military power. 
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The two reports are complemented by the administration’s first-ever Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review,77 as well as by the Presidential Policy 
Directive on Global Development, which look to add cohesion to the prolifera-
tion of government agencies that are involved in U.S. foreign and national security 
policy. All four of these reviews acknowledge climate change as a major factor in 
planning global development and security strategies. 
To meet this challenge the United States needs to provide a new brand of integrated 
21st century foreign, development, and security strategy in cooperation with part-
ners around the world. The Presidential Policy Directive is a first step in this direc-
tion. President Barack Obama noted in a speech to the United Nations shortly after 
the directive was completed that this new policy is built on the ideas that “dignity is a 
human right and global development is in our common interest.”78 While President 
Bush placed increased emphasis on development, President Obama’s speech marked 
the first time that the importance of global development was framed as a primary 
interest within the larger security environment by a U.S. president.
The climate, migration, and conflict nexus is one challenge that will create both 
questions and opportunities for U.S. policymakers learning to navigate this new 
environment. How they choose to address it will certainly have broader implica-
tions for the 21st century strategic environment, and the ongoing institutional 
debate in Washington will define the tools and resources available to policymakers 
confronting these issues.
Europe’s role in global-capacity development
Europe finds itself in a particularly challenging position. Rising migration from 
Africa—much of it illegal—is now a contentious domestic policy issue across 
the European Union and among nations outside the European Union, such as 
Norway. The European Union has responded to this increasing migration from 
Africa by partnering with the African Union (an association of 54 African states to 
strengthen political and socio-economic integration) to enhance safety at sea and 
formalize migration routes. The focus on better migratory coordination with the 
African Union is intended to reduce illegal immigration while creating a strong 
system of integration and remittances. Yet these two very unequal regional organi-
zations have not made any serious efforts to tackle climate change, migration, and 
conflict challenges on a region-to-region level. 
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At the bilateral level, however, there is more concrete action. For some time, the 
European Union has delegated the management of refugee issues to countries 
such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. This policy, however, will not 
hold in the long run and has already forced difficult compromises with regard to 
human-rights issues.
Take Spain: Although “irregular” African migrants (those who do not enter the 
country through legal channels) began arriving in Spain in 1994, public percep-
tion and policy debates changed after a larger number of boat refugees arrived in 
2007. The Spanish government signed an agreement with a number of nations 
to deter illegal migration, sent officials of its Interior Ministry to African coun-
tries, and began establishing Spanish Consulates in sub-Saharan Africa at the 
same time. Currently, liaison Officers of the Spanish Guardia Civil are cooperat-
ing with local police to discourage migrants from leaving via Senegal, Guinea, 
Mali, Mauretania, or Cape Verdes. 
More progressive policies are now being tried as well. Spain grants temporary 
working permits in small numbers (3,000 per year in the case of Senegal) for 
countries that accept repatriation of illegal immigrants in turn. Another pilot 
project that began in 2007 included the establishment of Spanish-run vocational 
schools in African countries so that younger potential migrants would stay home.79 
Belgium, Italy, and Spain—under the auspices of the European Union—also part-
ner with the Public Employment Services of Morocco, Tunisia, Benin, Cameroon, 
Mali, and Senegal to offer vocational training which matches the labor needs of 
the region’s economies and to provide migrants with alternative destinations.80 
But these steps alone will not resolve the migratory pressures on Europe. Javier 
Solana, the European Union’s former High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, points out that climate change threatens the entire 
multilateral system of the international community. He went further to say, “the 
effects of climate change would promote a policy of resentments between all those 
who are responsible for climate change and those who are its worst victims.”81 
This was a fairly transparent warning that climate migration might convert the 
Mediterranean into a flashpoint between Europe and Africa. 
Despite the difficulties of aligning the diverse interests of its member states into a 
broader regional approach, the European Union has taken steps toward addressing 
the nexus of climate, migration, and security in the Mediterranean basin affecting 
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its planning and implementation of development assistance to northwest Africa. 
One of the measures is the European Investment Bank’s regional focus on the 
Mediterranean Neighborhood, meant to integrate EIB services to the region. A 
prime example is the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, 
or FEMIP, which allocates financing and technical help to projects designed to 
promote sustainable economic growth in the nations of the basin. 
This allocation of financing has been accompanied by a promising change in rhetoric 
and a process of institutional reform within the European Union, with the establish-
ment of bodies integrating environmental and migration concerns with the process 
of development assistance and financing. The EIB’s 2009 establishment of the 
Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration, or MCMI, offers an example of these 
nascent changes. At the opening, Christian Masset, general director of Globalization, 
Development and Partnerships for the French Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs outlined the MCMI’s mission with an eye towards this process: 
In the Mediterranean Basin, one of the most populated and arid regions, we 
need to look together for the means to preserve the common space and public 
goods we are sharing in order to ensure sustainability for the population of the 
region. This is indeed what the MCMI aims at, and the meaning we seek to 
convey concerning ‘the Mediterranean integration.’82
The realization of the region’s interdependence—and its shared environmental 
concerns—is an important step which, accompanied by projects to promote 
sustainable development and increase employment in migrants’ countries of 
origin, represents the opening attempt to tackle the problems posed by the nexus 
of climate, migration, and security. But there is undoubtedly a long way to go in 
integrating diverse institutional bodies, fully appreciating the interplay of climate 
change with migration and security issues, interfacing with other regional institu-
tions, and expanding scope to other regions.
The role of international organizations and regional powers
There is still considerable concern regarding the ability of international organiza-
tions in their present forms to address this nexus in an integrated fashion. These 
doubts have their roots in many of the same organizational problems facing the 
United States—the proliferation of organizations with overlapping responsibilities 
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and the diffusion of expertise and funding. While comprehensive reform would be 
the best solution, there have been some positive examples of cooperation between 
international organizations like the World Bank and national or multilateral devel-
opment banks. The World Bank, for example, has had success sponsoring climate 
change adaptation programs through its Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, or 
PPCR. Founded in 2008 the PPCR has committed $1 billion to date under the 
umbrella of the World Bank Climate Investment Fund, implemented via the five 
large multilateral development banks that offer grants and loans.83
Additionally, cooperation between more cohesive, agile national banks and inter-
national bodies with regional expertise could provide an example for regions just 
beginning to reckon with the climate-conflict nexus. The Kf W Entwicklungsbank, 
a German government-funded development bank, offers a promising model for 
addressing the root causes of climate migration in the short-term through regional 
bodies. Kf W has sponsored studies of responsible cross-border river manage-
ment in West Africa and Central Asia, as well as runoff management from melting 
glaciers in the Andean region. 
Kf W’s 2010 accord with the West African Development Bank provides grants 
from the German federal budget, allowing the development bank to offer favor-
able loans to the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Senegal for 
climate-adaptation projects. The €10.6 million ($13 million) grant has allowed the 
development bank to finance irrigation and drainage projects projected to total 
€60 million.84 Kf W’s approach incorporates efforts to mitigate the effects of cli-
mate change in varied regional settings while preparing local populations to adapt 
to changing conditions.
On a more international scale, the International Organization on Migration, or 
IOM, as well as the United Nations are working to ensure humane migration, 
study migration patterns and development, and establish an international dialogue 
on the legal norms surrounding migration. The IOM spent more than $1.4 bil-
lion in 2010 on more than 2,900 projects. The IOM has also worked in concert 
with organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, or 
ECOWAS, to bring attention to migration and build management capacity. With 
funding from international donors, IOM and ECOWAS administer migration 
law training programs and migration-management workshops throughout West 
Africa and the Sahel, established a West African migration dialogue, and improved 
migration management mechanisms in the region.85 
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While the IOM remains largely focused on improving migration management and 
ensuring humane treatment—crucial immediate concerns in many regions—it 
has not yet fully addressed the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict. In 
contrast, the Asian Development Bank, or ADB, has begun a thoughtful planning 
process to address the threat in the region. ADB’s initial 2008 study highlighted 
the populations likely to be at greatest risk and underscored the “urgency of devel-
oping policies, appropriate institutions and mechanisms to cope with the impact 
of climate change on migration.”86 
The policy proposals and technical assistance emerging from the most recent confer-
ence in Manila this year awarded funding for more detailed empirical study of the 
problem in the most threatened areas, programs to improve understanding among 
regional governments, and a study of potential financing instruments to fund the 
appropriate responses.87 Yet the ADB’s studies on climate and migration illustrate 
both the promise and problems currently facing those trying to confront the nexus; 
its planning process is sound, but the financing and resources are insufficient. 
The role of regional powers
It is difficult to develop financial instruments for uncertain or unpredictable future 
events, a challenge further complicated by divergent national interests and the 
uncertain international status of climate migrants. Without serious buy-in from 
rising regional powers, responses will remain haphazard, locked in the planning 
stages, unacceptably slow, or tied to the diminishing and varying capabilities of 
the Western powers. Emerging regional powers such as Brazil, Turkey, India, 
and South Africa should acknowledge that in this century their security will be 
inextricably linked to that of their respective regions. Presented with the chal-
lenge of climate change, migration, and conflict, these powers must assume greater 
regional responsibility in making effective preparations. 
The regional powers, already asserting their economic and diplomatic strength 
in their respective regions, have begun to assume the wider responsibilities of 
regional human security. Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
has dispatched significant military and civilian humanitarian aid to Pakistan 
in the wake of the 2005 earthquake and 2010 floods, and done much to assert 
its regional influence. Domestically Turkey is in the process of implementing a 
National Climate Change Action Plan and the National Action Plan on Migration 
and Asylum, aimed at reducing irregular migration.88 In support of the IOM, 
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Turkey has funded a project to enhance the capacities of Turkish municipalities 
to deal with humanitarian and social needs of migrants.89 Turkey would do well to 
broaden its climate mitigation plan to address the added complexity of migration, 
and to broaden its scope to match its growing regional role. 
Brazil, too, has taken the first steps to greater regional responsibility with its com-
mitments in Haiti over the last decade. Brazil provides humanitarian aid, has around 
1,300 troops stationed on the island, and commands the U.N. peacekeeping force. 
From 2004–2010, the Brazilian government spent $577 million on its mission in 
Haiti.90 But Brazil can do more; for instance by taking a leading role in establish-
ing an effective framework to handle migration in South America, particularly with 
the at-risk Andean region. The hope is that these powers can bring their growing 
resources and local understanding to regional problems of climate change, migra-
tion, and conflict. Through acceptance of the problem presented by this nexus, early 
capacity-building and regional mobilization, the transition can be made less painful.
The way forward
The United States today lacks the policy postures necessary to address climate 
change, migration, and conflict in a systematic and proactive manner. While 
USAID is the official development agency of the U.S. government, additional 
foreign-assistance programs looking to promote economic, social, and environ-
mental development are spread out over 20 government agencies, departments, 
and initiatives. Each program has its own goals, priorities, and procedures. The ad-
hoc nature of U.S. development assistance and the past militarization of aid mean 
that even USAID lacks the authority to coordinate these disparate programs. 
Moreover, even though the State Department is supposed to serve as the locus of 
U.S. diplomatic and development expertise, the post-9/11 reality in the United 
States is a system that depends on the military to carry out “soft power” tasks for 
which it is well-funded, and sometimes very successful, but for which it is not 
well-suited over the long term. This organizational disorder severely undercuts our 
ability to help countries manage and emerge from complex crises.91
The ability of the United States to address these issues at the domestic level is 
further complicated by climate change skeptics, especially in Congress, who reject 
the overwhelming consensus of the global scientific community. This doubt, in the 
face of all evidence, has not prevented the State Department and the U.S. Agency 
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for International Development from moving forward with initiatives to address 
the effects of climate change (as discussed in the following section), and may not 
deter limited domestic progress. But the lack of serious buy-in from Congress will 
affect funding for these priorities and cannot be circumvented indefinitely.
On the international level, myriad political differences between different nations and 
groups of nations weaken the ability of global organizations such as the World Bank 
and regional development banks to focus in on the nexus of climate change, migration, 
and conflict. Consequentially, organizations such as the United Nations and the Group 
of 20 forum of the top developed and developing nations, designed to help developed 
and developing nations tackle this kind of issue, struggle to take concerted action. 
The United Nations has never been equipped to take collective action outside of a 
case-by-case basis where consensus among specific members has been achieved. 
Therefore, expecting the organization to take on the nexus of climate change, migra-
tion, and conflict is unrealistic. This is particularly true given the likelihood that future 
conflicts will not be clearly defined as caused by climate or migration, and thus rela-
tively “blameless,” but will more likely incorporate ethnic or political divisions. This 
would make concerted U.N. action nearly impossible. Concerted action by the Group 
of 20 is not much more realistic due to its economic and financial focus, compounded 
by varied interests often preventing the development of effective political measures.
Indeed, one of the most significant consequences of the end of the Cold War is the 
diffusion of power. The United States, of course, remains the major political player 
on a global level, but while terrorism provides a common enemy to all responsible 
nations, nation states and international alliances are not by default the most signifi-
cant actors anymore, and have proved unweildy in addressing unconventional threats. 
Meanwhile, in the developing world, the weakening of some state structures will strain 
these governments’ ability to work with the international community to address the 
roots and results of complex crises in a comprehensive manner. As challenges like the 
climate change, migration, and conflict nexus grow and donor-country budgets are 
strained, it is important that the international community respond with a common 
global approach and a division of labor based on regional priorities and scenarios. 
That may seem like a pie-in-the-sky ambition given the analysis in this chapter 
of our report. But we hope our recommendations in the next and final chapter 
point the way toward a way of resolving the serious global-security issues posed by 
climate change, migration, and conflict. 
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Conclusion: Policy recommendations 
The nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict in the 21st century will test 
the capabilities of the United States and the world to manage global security 
in ways never thought of before. The need for new policies and programs that 
foster global sustainable security amid wrenching human dislocation will require 
creative development, diplomatic, and military responses that are international in 
scope yet tailored to unique local and regional situations. None of this will be easy.
But it will be mandatory. As this paper demonstrates, there is no running away 
from the nexus we’ve detailed in this opening paper of our series on this subject. 
And as our following reports on northwest Africa, India and Bangladesh, the 
Andean region, and China will demonstrate, unified action will require the partici-
pation of national governments, regional groups, and international organizations. 
Much of that action, though, will be specific to these and other regions. This 
means that overarching recommendations may not be as useful or as applicable 
to different regions, depending on the unique circumstances of climate change, 
migration, and conflict in each area of the globe. Still, there are useful general 
recommendations to be made—recommendations that we believe will help the 
United States, Europe, regional groups, and international organizations prepare 
for this unique 21st century challenge. Let’s begin with the United States.
U.S. institutional reform
There are a number of broad steps that the U.S. government can take to build on 
the four reports addressing U.S. security and development strategies that were 
recently issued by the Obama administration (see pages 5, 25-26 for details). 
These recommendations are necessarily bureaucratic in scope since our overarch-
ing recommendation for the U.S. government is to overhaul its national security, 
diplomatic, and development functions to focus squarely on sustainable security. 
Sustainable security redefines how we think about national security in today’s 
shifting, globalized world. Our security can no longer be guaranteed by military 
strength or economic clout alone, but only by our ability to compel collective action. 
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Particularly given the increasing influence of the nexus between climate change, 
migration, and conflict, our security is now irrevocably linked to that of others. Water 
shortage, desertification, and erosion do not respect international boundaries, and 
desperate climate migrants will strain even the best-prepared government bodies. 
This reality calls for a new progressive approach to foreign policy and national 
security that emphasizes development alongside defense and diplomacy. 
Sustainable security is a bold rethinking of national security that introduces the 
notions of collective and human security and rebalances the three tools of foreign 
policy—defense, diplomacy, and development.92 With that in mind, here are our 
broad recommendations for the United States:
•	 Prioritize planning for the long-term humanitarian consequences of climate 
change and migration as a core national security issue. This planning should 
be conducted across agencies and then unified into a comprehensive plan at the 
White House with input from Congress. Also, for example, ensure that USAID 
and the Foreign Service Institute educate new and existing staff on the interplay 
of climate change, migration and security.
•	 Create a unified national security budget. This will require the integration of 
defense, diplomacy, and development funding into a comprehensive national 
security budget that recognizes the importance of non-military instruments in 
achieving security, and that helps to better synchronize funding and priorities 
across agencies. 
•	 Address the development-security relationship. While the climate-security 
link has reached high-level discourse within the U.S. government, the current 
emphasis on rebalancing defense, diplomacy, and development has raised the 
question of exactly how U.S. development and security policy should be inte-
grated to address this linkage more effectively and efficiently. The game-chang-
ing innovations envisioned in the State Department’s Quadrennial Defense 
Review are the best place to start, but that review is in the early stages of imple-
mentation and needs to be put into practice soon so that the United States can 
maintain and widen its global leadership role in this field. 
•	 The Global Development Policy needs to specifically address climate migration.93 
The directive on climate change and adaptation does not explicitly talk about 
migration. The implementation of the Policy Directive on Global Development 
is a good opportunity to go beyond the high-level discourse and expand the 
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debate about complex crisis scenarios to include the realities of climate migra-
tion as a threat to global security.
•	 Support USAID’s analysis on the intersection of Adaptation, Conflict 
Management and Mitigation. The USAID review examines how climate change 
is threatening food and water security in interrelated ways leading to potential 
conflict and argues for the need of more comprehensive environmental coopera-
tion and new institutional arrangements. Taking this approach to heart, the U.S. 
government should establish a coordinating mechanism for these discussions 
between governments, nongovernment organizations, and policymakers. The 
review should also consider the importance of migration and human security 
alongside food and water security.
•	 Develop strategies to strengthen intergovernmental cooperation on trans-
boundary risks in different regions of the world. The U.S. government needs to 
improve the capacities of the Department of State and USAID to work through 
and support regional bodies such as Economic Community of West African 
States, the African Union, the Asian Development Bank, or the West-African 
Development Bank to deliver security solutions for the nexus of climate change, 
migration, and conflict. The United States must also work with its allies, regional 
groups, and international organizations to ensure these bodies engage in mean-
ingful sustainable development which addresses these new priorities. 
Immediate U.S. action
There are immediate steps that the United States can take to alleviate some of the 
threats posed by climate change, migration, and conflict. These steps involve hard 
choices for the Obama administration and Congress in an era of tight fiscal policy. 
Yet U.S. national security is also at stake here. Specifically, we recommend:
•	 Improving U.S. civilian capacities to respond to mega crises by further enhanc-
ing the work of Disaster Assistance Response Teams. These DART teams need 
the resources to develop plans to deploy senior humanitarian coordinators in 
the initial days of a response to a crisis, and facilitate integrated planning among 
development, diplomatic, and security communities.
•	 Increasing funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative. This program 
is implemented through USAID, the Department of the Treasury, and the 
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Department of State.94 Maintaining sufficient funding for the Global Climate 
Change Initiative in a time of budget austerity will be a challenge, but the 
administration should make a strong push to do so over the next few years. 
Underfunding the initiative now will almost certainly lead to higher costs later. 
International institutional reform
•	 Ensure better information flows and effective disaster response for early-warning 
systems among international institutions such as the World Bank and World 
Health Organization.
•	 Improve coordination of emergency-preparedness activities, including predict-
able, systematic, and coherent approaches to capacity development for national 
and local actors, preparation for displacement, and incorporation of disaster 
preparedness into developmental programming.
•	 Prioritize international action on the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, including integrating the principles into national law as has been 
done already in some countries. 
•	 Support regional mechanisms to protect Internationally Displaced Persons, which 
may drive progress more efficiently than international efforts in some cases. One 
example is the African Union’s Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons, known as the Kampala Convention.95 
Continuing research 
The other major conclusion of this paper is the need to better understand the 
nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict. Individually all three require 
better understanding, particularly regarding on-the-ground situations. But more 
importantly, more research is needed on the nexus itself. To do so, we recommend 
that the regional development banks as well the International Organization of 
Migration engage in the following sets of research projects:
•	 Adapt current migration-monitoring tools to better assess people’s motivations 
for moving, and to understand slow and cumulative vulnerabilities created by 
population displacement and movement before they reach critical thresholds.
 Conclusion: policy recommendations | www.americanprogress.org 37
•	 Support the best science to expand the knowledge base on specific interac-
tions— such as desertification, rainfall variability, disaster occurrence, and 
coastal erosion—in relation to human migration and conflict challenges.
•	 Identify regions particularly vulnerable to climate-induced migration, including 
forced and voluntary mobility, in order to target aid, information, and contin-
gency-planning capabilities.
•	 Analyze migration as a proactive strategy by local populations under pressure 
due to increasing environmental change.
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